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ABSTRACT 
 Political leaders, military leaders, and the general public gather information from 
images and video to make decisions. Media can be spread instantaneously throughout the 
world at low cost and anonymously using social media, allowing small groups to gain 
powerful influence. This leaves the United States vulnerable to deception by media 
forgery. The problem of media forgery is not new, but the recent advances in machine 
learning have led to the development of DeepFakes, which are more sophisticated and 
difficult to identify. DeepFakes are especially dangerous because they can be used to 
change the identity of a person in a video or image. Detecting DeepFakes has been the 
focus of academic research, and several techniques have been developed and show 
promising results on available data sets, but the suitability of these algorithms for 
deployment within the Department of Defense or any other critical environment is an 
open question. This research provides a decisive answer to this question for a promising 
recent analytic that uses inconsistent head poses to detect when an image is manipulated. 
v 
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The evolution of the internet and satellite technology has closed the gap between people
around the world. This connectivity leaves us vulnerable to attack in new ways such as
information campaigns that target our elections, or seek to destabilize vulnerable regions
around theworld.While theUnited States homeland stillmaintains the geographic advantage
provided by the oceans on our borders, the significance is minimized in this new era of
warfare in the information domain.
These new vulnerabilities are described in the 2017 National Security Strategy as Infor-
mation Statecraft, which are efforts by competitors to weaponize information to attack the
values and institutions that underpin free society (Trump 2017). These efforts become more
dangerous as competitors integrate information from personal and commercial sources with
intelligence collection and data analytic capabilities based on artificial intelligence and
machine learning to target and enhance their misinformation techniques (Trump 2017).
DeepFakes will become weapons in this new domain of Information Statecraft, giving
competitors the ability to insert synthetically generated faces using deep learning techniques
to change the identity of an individual in a video, or manipulate their facial features.
DeepFakes may be used to target political and military leaders in an attempt to disrupt the
public’s confidence in our leaders. TheUnited Statesmust develop the ability to process large
amounts of media, and identify DeepFakes reliably in order to defend against these threats.
Several DeepFake classification analytics have been developed and show great promise in
an academic setting, but for many the performance does not generalize to other data sets or
newer generations of DeepFakes. We must develop a more complete understanding of the
performance of these analytics before they will be suitable for use in the field.
Our research develops a deeper understanding of the analytic that Yang et al. (2019) propose
that classifies DeepFakes using inconsistent head poses. We provide in depth analysis of the
landmark estimation algorithm along with the head pose estimation procedure used by the
analytic, that expose weaknesses such as overtraining on the facial structure of individuals
along with systematic errors in the head pose optimization process. The problems we
uncover cause us to question multiple assumptions that are fundamental to the design of
xv
the analytic, and undermine our confidence in the generalizability of its performance. We
justify our conclusions by conducting experiments on four new data sets that showcase the
challenge of classifying DeepFakes in realistic scenarios.
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“It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America is a target,
whether from terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious cyber activity against
personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; or political and information
subversion”
—2018 National Defense Strategy
This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of classifying DeepFakes using inconsistent head
poses with the goal of understanding how the analytic works on a variety of data sets, and
exposing challenges that must be overcome prior to its implementation. Specifically, we
identify several challenges fundamental to the operation of the analytic: the training process
can create a bias causing the analytic to classify individuals based on how they appear in the
training set, the optimization algorithm is not suited for head pose estimation, and estimated
positions of facial landmarks are not independent. We systematically analyze the methods
used within the analytic to expose the source of these problems, which may serve to as the
foundation for future work to correct the analytic or influence the development of future
analytics.
1.1 Motivation
DeepFakes are media that have been altered completely or in part using deep learning
techniques, and can potentially be used to interfere with elections and diminish the public’s
confidence in our military leaders. As the field of machine learning continues to develop,
DeepFakes are becoming more sophisticated, realistic, and difficult to classify. Researchers
are developing new and more intricate methods for classifying DeepFakes, but their per-
formance outside of the academic setting must be well understood before they can be
implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD). Yang et al. (2019) propose an analytic
to classify DeepFakes based on inconsistencies in the estimated head poses. This thesis takes
a critical look at this analytic by breaking down the methods used to process the image and
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develop features for classification. We conduct tests to evaluate the analytic’s performance
on new data sets that reflect the challenges of classifying media posted in an online setting.
Our research reveals weaknesses in the methods used to develop the features, and show that
these weaknesses result in poor performance on new data sets.
1.2 Military Relevance
The evolution of the internet and satellite technology has closed the gap between people
around the world. This interconnectedness has unquestionably leads to great things across
the globe such as widespread access to news and education sources, and has minimized
the barriers to conducting business on an international scale. These connections also leave
us vulnerable to attack in new ways such as information campaigns targeting our elections
as reported by Shane and Mazzetti (2018), and destabilizing vulnerable regions around the
world as documented by Taub and Fisher (2018). While the United States homeland still
maintains the geographic advantage provided by the oceans on our borders, the significance
is minimized in this new era of warfare in the information domain.
These new vulnerabilities are described in the 2017 National Security Strategy as Infor-
mation Statecraft, which are efforts by competitors to weaponize information to attack the
values and institutions that underpin free society (Trump 2017). These efforts become more
dangerous as competitors integrate information from personal and commercial sources with
intelligence collection and data analytic capabilities based on artificial intelligence and
machine learning to target and enhance their misinformation techniques (Trump 2017).
DeepFakes will become weapons in this new domain of Information Statecraft giving
competitors the ability to insert synthetically generated faces using deep learning techniques
to change the identity of an individual in a video, or manipulate their facial features.
DeepFakes may be used to target political and military leaders in an attempt to disrupt
elections or diminish the public’s confidence in military leaders. The United States must
develop the ability to process large amounts of media, and identify DeepFakes reliably in
order to defend against these threats.
Several DeepFake classification analytics have been developed and show great promise in
an academic setting, but for many the performance does not generalize to other data sets or
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newer generations of DeepFakes. We must develop a more complete understanding of the
performance of these analytics before they will be suitable for use in the field.
1.3 Technical Background
This section provides an introduction to the term DeepFake, and then focuses our attention
on the face swap style DeepFake that Yang et al. (2019) designed the analytic to classify.
We discuss the steps of creating a face swap DeepFake using an autoencoder as well as
present common post-processing techniques used to finish the creation process. This section
concludes with a discussion of different DeepFake classification techniques demonstrating
various strategies for identifying DeepFakes. These introductions provide context for the
review of the analytic in the following sections.
1.3.1 Introduction to DeepFakes
In recent years, applications of deep learning to image manipulation have led to the emer-
gence of DeepFakes, which lower technological barriers to creating high-quality manipu-
lations. One of the most common tools for generating DeepFakes is the autoencoder-based
face swap; see for example Petrov et al. (2020); Anonymous (2020a); Noon van der Silk
(2019); Gareth Dunstone (2021); Anonymous (2020b). Though the term “DeepFake” is
sometimes used as a universal descriptor for any synthetic media generated wholly or par-
tially with deep learning, in this thesis we use it to describe images which are created with
an autoencoder-based face swap. Though minor differences exist between implementations,
we outline the generation of autoencoder-based DeepFakes in this section.
The steps required to swap the face from a source actor and place it on the body of a target
actor using an autoencoder are as follows. First, images must be preprocessed by extracting
faces from them. This step requires facial detection, alignment, and segmentation steps.
Face detection itself is a mature technology, and many tools exist for automating it, with
the result that faces can be detected across multiple images quickly. Examples include the
get_frontal_face_detectormethod from the dlib package King (2009), and the
face_cascade classifier from the opencv package Bradski (2000). Facial alignment
can also be conducted quickly, because estimating the optimal affine transforms between
two sets of 2D points is straightforward. Li et al. (2020) proposes an automated method for
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segmentation by selecting the facial region in the convex hull of a set of facial landmarks,
though this process yields poor results when the subject has hair or accessories obscuring
part of the face, so it can require manual intervention.
After preprocessing, an autoencoder network is adversarially trained on the aligned faces,
where a single encoder network is used for both actors but separate decoders are used for the
source and target actor. After training, the swap is performed by encoding the features of the
target actor, and then decoding the features with the source decoder. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the process of training and then swapping decoders in order to create DeepFakes.
Figure 1.1. The process of training autoencoders and then exchanging
decoders to generate a DeepFake. Source: Güera and Delp (2018).
Postprocessing is an important final step to eliminate visual artifacts where the swapped
inner region meets the outer portion of the face. Common techniques for doing so include
Poisson blending, where the DeepFake’s color gradient is taken to be a linear combination
of the original and swapped portions of the face, for details see Zhang et al. (2020). Petrov
et al. (2020) uses an alternate technique of blurring the entire face (using Gaussian blur,
for example) and then apply a super-resolution network to reconstruct a realistic face from
the blurred one. An impressive property of this approach is that a properly trained super-




Motivated by the convincing nature of modern DeepFakes, many methods have been pro-
posed to detect them from authentic images. These methods can be partitioned by the
features they use to detect the manipulated image. Though not specific to DeepFake detec-
tion, methods which are designed to detect image splicing, where a part of a source image is
placed into a target image, can also be applied for this purpose. For example, Nguyen et al.
(2019a) trains an autoencoder to partition a face into spliced and unmanipulated regions.
Similarly, Huh et al. (2018) leverages image metadata to detect inconsistencies and generate
a splice mask for various regions of an image.Wu et al. (2019) take a different perspective by
formulating a hypothesis test to detect splicing at each pixel, using 𝑍-scores constructed for
various neighborhoods of the pixel as a test statistic. Zhao et al. (2020) detect spliced regions
using steganalysis features unique to the processing of individual cameras by comparing
these features in two different regions of an image.
Another large class of techniques trains a classifier to detect images generated by either
convolutional or generative adversarial networks. For example, Guarnera et al. (2020) uses
an expectation maximization algorithm (EM) to detect patterns of correlation among pixel
neighborhoods. The correlation patterns are used to classifywhether an imagewas generated
by a convolutional network. Similarly, Wang et al. (2020) shows that images generated by
a large suite of convolution-based generators (including DeepFakes) can be detected by
training a ResNet model on images from only a single generator, which suggests that these
images exhibit common structure. Considering GANs instead of convolutional networks,
Yu et al. (2019) considers the residual of an autoencoder-based image reconstruction as a
“GAN fingerprint” and uses it to classify GAN-generated from authentic images. Along
similar lines, Zhang et al. (2019) uses a discrete Fourier transform to detect artifacts of the
upsampling procedure used by many GAN-based image generators.
Some methods for classifying authentic from manipulated images use deep learning, but
do not focus on specific features of the DeepFake generation process. Instead, they train the
model using authentic and manipulated images and rely on the model to develop its own
features to classify the images. For example, Afchar et al. (2018) uses a lower number of
layers in its architecture, and Nguyen et al. (2019b), who uses a capsule network as opposed
to more traditional convolutional layers.
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A final class of techniques uses features derived from knowledge that the image contains
a human face. Li et al. (2018a) classifies manipulated videos by noting the lack of natural
blinking patterns. More recent DeepFakes circumvent this by including images with a
blinking subject in the training data. Matern et al. (2019) detect manipulated images using
inconsistencies in the eye and teeth regions, where lack of detail is common. Agarwal
et al. (2019) consider the problem of classifying videos that contain a certain individual,
such as a public figure. The analytic captures the individual’s facial mannerisms using a
correlation matrix of facial actions, such as eyebrow raising and chin raising, across frames
in a video, and uses this correlation matrix as features in an SVM to determine authentic
from manipulated videos. In follow-up work, Agarwal et al. (2020) uses a convolutional
network to capture facial mannerisms, which avoids the labor-intensive process of hand-
crafting the correlation-based features. Finally, Ciftci et al. (2020) estimates blood volume
changes that occur due to a rhythmic heartbeat, and uses this information to distinguish
authentic from synthetic videos. The analytic we consider in this paper falls in this final
class of techniques that leverage the fact that the image contains a human subject, because




Review of the Analytic
In this chapter we give an overview of how the analytic works, and provide some introduc-
tions to the methods and tools the analytic uses to process images for classification. The
first section introduces how the analytic proposes to classify deepfakes. This is followed
by a section dedicated to the development of an equation to approximate the action of the
camera from the pinhole camera model, and explains the approximations that are necessary
for the analytic to apply the equation. The third section explains how the facial landmarks
are approximated and how they are used to develop the head pose estimates. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of how the analytic is trained, including a subsection on the
support vector machine classifier.
2.1 Review of the Analytic
The goal of this section is to provide a broad overview of the analytic to establish the proper
context for the following sections. This includes a demonstration of how the analytic is
trying to distinguish between real and DeepFake images. We provide a basic summary of
how the analytic functions and discuss why we expect this analytic could succeed.
The analytic takes advantage of the fact that only the inner region of the face is manipulated
in an autoencoder based face swap by comparing the head pose estimated based on central
landmarks to the head pose estimated based on the full set of landmarks. Yang et al. (2019)
claim that if the image is manipulated, only the central facial landmarks are affected and the
two pose estimates may differ, while in a real image the two poses should align. A support
vector machine classifier is trained using the head pose features to make the classification.
Figure 2.1 is included in the original paper by Yang et al. (2019) to illustrate the authors’
claim that inconsistent head poses can be used to classify DeepFakes even if these incon-
sistencies are not distinguishable by the human eye. Image (a) is a real image and the red
dots are the estimated position of the central facial landmarks. The red vector represents
the orientation of the head relative to the camera. Image (b) is the same real image where
the blue dots are the estimated positions of all the facial landmarks, and the blue vector
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represents the orientation of the head relative to the camera. Image (c) shows a comparison
of the vectors from images (a) and (b), and they closely align indicating that the image is
not manipulated. The dots and vectors in images (d), (e), and (f) represent the same features
as in the previous images, but the image is manipulated. Image (f) shows a comparison of
the two orientation vectors and they do not align, indicating that the image is a DeepFake.




Figure 2.1. Visualization of the analytic applied to a real and fake im-
age. Source: Yang et al. (2019).
2.2 Pinhole Camera Model
In this section, we derive the equation the analytic uses to approximate the action of the
camera, which is based on the pinhole camera model. We also present the pinhole camera
model in detail to understand its limitations, and use a simple example to illustrate the use of
the model. Hata and Savarese (2015) provide an excellent introduction to the pinhole camera
model along with a review of the simple lens model to provide a better understanding of
the development of the model along with its limitations.
8
Coordinate Systems
Figure 2.2. Basic pinhole camera model. Source: Hata and Savarese
(2015).
Name Origin Units Notation
World Center of Face mm 𝑃𝑤𝑐
Camera Aperture of Camera 𝑂 mm 𝑃𝑐
Image Center of Image Plane 𝐶′ mm 𝑃′
𝑖
Pixel Lower Left Corner of Image Plane px 𝑃′𝑝𝑥
Table 2.1. Summary of coordinate systems
Four separate coordinate systems are used to describe points in the formulation of this prob-
lem and are summarized in Table 2.1 and illustrated in Figure 2.2. The three-dimensional
camera coordinate system is centered at the aperture of the camera 𝑂 and is measured in
millimeters (mm). The world coordinate system is also three-dimensional and measured in
mm, but is centered on the subject’s face. The two-dimensional image coordinate system
is on the image plane and is centered at 𝐶′, where the optical axis intersects the image
plane, and is measured in mm. The pixel coordinate system is a two-dimensional coordinate
system on the image plane, but its origin is on the lower left hand corner of the image and
is measured in pixels (px).
9
The camera and image coordinate systems are depicted in the Figure 2.2 above along with a
point 𝑃 in 3 dimensions which is projected to the point 𝑃′ in the image plane. The distance
𝑓 is the focal length of the camera, and is the distance between the camera aperture and
the image sensor. In Figure 2.2 the focal length is shown along the optical axis between the
aperture of the camera 𝑂 and the image plane and is measured in mm. We now establish
notation that we use throughout to demonstrate the pinhole camera model, and begin with














The projection of the point 𝑃 onto the 2-dimensional image plane is represented by 𝑃′. The
point 𝑃′ can be measured using either the pixel coordinate system or the image coordinate















Projecting a Point in World Coordinates onto the Image Plane
In this section we use the pinhole camera model to project a 3D point in world coordinates
to a 2D point in pixel coordinates. This projection process is an important prerequisite for
the pose estimation portion of the analytic because it allows us to evaluate a pose estimate.
We evaluate a pose estimate by using the rotation matrix 𝑅 and translation vector ®𝑡 to project
the points from the average face model in world coordinates into the image plane in pixel
coordinates for comparison to the position of the facial landmarks estimated from the image.
The first step is to transform an arbitrary point 𝑃 from world coordinates to camera coordi-
nates. This requires rotating the coordinate system with a rotation matrix 𝑅 and translating
the coordinate system with ®𝑡, so that the camera lens lies at the origin. We accomplish this










 + ®𝑡 (2.5)
We now have the position of point P measured in reference to the camera aperture, and
are ready to project the point into the image plane. Figure 2.3 provides a two-dimensional
representation that highlights the relationship between the 𝑋 dimension of the point 𝑃 in
world coordinates and the 𝑥 dimension of the point 𝑃′ in image coordinates.
Figure 2.3. Similar triangles used to derive projection from camera
coordinates to the image plane.
11
We develop equations 2.6 and 2.7 from the similar triangles shown in yellow in Figure 2.3










Converting from Image Coordinates to Pixel Coordinates
The conversion from image coordinates to pixel coordinates requires a conversion from
millimeters to pixels. Since pixels may not be square, separate conversion factors 𝑘 and 𝑙 in
pixels per millimeter are used to convert the image coordinates. After the conversion of the
𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinates to pixels, they are shifted using 𝑐𝑥 and 𝑐𝑦 to reflect the change of the
origin from the center of the image plane to the lower left corner of the image. The resulting
conversions are shown in equations (2.8) and (2.9).
𝑝𝑥 = 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑐𝑥 (2.8)
𝑝𝑦 = 𝑦𝑙 + 𝑐𝑦 (2.9)
Mapping Points from Camera Coordinate System to Points in the Image Plane in Pixel
Coordinates
In previous sections we show step by step how to project a point in the camera coordinate
system to a point on the image planemeasured in the pixel coordinate system. The projection
is necessary in order to compare the positions of the projected points to the estimated
positions of the facial landmarks gathered from the image. In this section we bring these
steps together and represent them in a matrix form to simplify the implementation of the
projections in later work.
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Combining equations (2.4), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) we get a representation of the
















We can see from equation (2.10) that the operation is not linear because of the division by
𝑍 , so the operation cannot be represented as a matrix vector product. We can rewrite the











𝑓 𝑘𝑋 + 𝑐𝑥𝑍
𝑓 𝑙𝑌 + 𝑐𝑦𝑍
𝑍
 (2.11)










𝑓 𝑘 0 𝑐𝑥








Although there is only a single focal length for the camera in a given image, substitutions
are made in equation (2.12) 𝑓𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑘 and 𝑓𝑦 = 𝑓 𝑙 to reduce the number of parameters in the
model, and are referred to as the focal length in the 𝑥 and 𝑦 directions, respectively. This
leaves us with equation (2.13) as our final equation we use to approximate the action of the
camera. We are now ready to discuss how the equation is used to develop 3D head pose


















2.3 3D Head Pose Estimation
We now show how the positions of the facial landmarks are determined in the image, as
well as how the landmark positions are approximated in world coordinates using the average
face model. This is followed by a definition of the 3D head pose and an explanation of how
equation 2.13, developed in the previous section, is used to formulate the optimization
problem for estimating the head pose. The final subsection provides an introduction to the
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm used to solve the head pose estimation problem.
2.3.1 Estimating the Position of the Landmarks in the Image
The optimality of the head pose is based on the squared distance between the projected
points from the head pose and the estimated landmark positions, making the landmark
position estimation a critical part of the analytic. The landmark estimation process requires
the isolation of the facial region followed by the estimation of the landmark positions. The
analytic uses the get_frontal_face_detector method from the dlib package to
isolate the facial region. Next the landmark positions are estimated by passing the facial
region of the image intodlib package’s defaultdlib.shape_predictor for detecting
68 facial landmarks, 38 of which are used by the analytic. The subset of these landmarks
shown in white in Figure 2.4 are discarded because their positions aren’t fixedwith respect to
the position and orientation of the head. The landmarks shown in red lie in the manipulated
region of a face swap are categorized as central facial landmarks. The remaining landmarks
shown in blue are along the outer region of the face, and it is assumed that their positions
are unaffected by a face swap. The analytic utilizes these landmarks in two groups, the
central landmarks group which are shown in red, and all landmarks group which include
the landmarks shown in blue as well as the ones shown in red.
2.3.2 Estimating Landmark Position in World Coordinates
The position of the facial landmarks is unknown in both the camera and world coordinates,
so approximations must be made to determine the 3D head pose. The analytic estimates
the landmark positions in world coordinates by drawing them from a 3D model provided
by Baltrusaitis et al. (2018), which is shown in Figure 2.5. This model represents the facial
landmark positions of an average face. The analytic projects the landmark positions into
the image plane using the rotation matrix 𝑅 and translation vector ®𝑡 that define the 3D head
14
Figure 2.4. Facial landmarks detected using the
















Figure 2.5. 3D average face model used as estimates in world coordi-
nates. Source: Baltrusaitis et al. (2018).
pose, and then compares the positions of the projected points to the landmark positions
estimated from the image to evaluate the fit of the selected head pose.
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2.3.3 3D Head Pose Defined
For the purposes of this analytic, the 3D head pose corresponds to the rotation and trans-
lation of the world coordinates centered on the subject’s face to the corresponding camera
coordinates centered at the aperture of the camera. Specifically, let [𝑈,𝑉,𝑊]𝑇 represent a
facial landmark in world coordinates, and [𝑋,𝑌, 𝑍]𝑇 be its corresponding camera coordi-










 + ®𝑡 (2.14)
where 𝑅 is the 3 x 3 rotation matrix with 𝑅−1 giving the orientation of the head relative to
the camera, and ®𝑡 is the 3 x 1 translation vector giving the position of the head relative to
the camera. The rotation matrix and translation vector are used to define the 3D head pose,
and are used to create input features for the classifier.
2.3.4 3D Head Pose Estimation
Here we formulate the optimization problem used to estimate the 3D head pose. The
estimation of the head pose is a fundamental part of the analytic because the head poses are
used to develop features to classify the image. The formulation of the optimization problem
is based on equation (2.15) developed in section 2.2 from the pinhole camera model, which
relates the positions of the facial landmarks in camera coordinates to the landmark positions

















where (𝑥, 𝑦) is the position of the facial landmark in the image plane, 𝑓𝑥 and 𝑓𝑦 correspond
to the focal lengths in the 𝑥 and 𝑦 directions, (𝑐𝑥 , 𝑐𝑦) is the optical center, and 𝑠 is an
unknown scaling factor. Since the camera used to capture the image is unknown, the
intrinsic parameters of the camera must be approximated.
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Figure 2.6. Figure illustrating approximation of focal width using field
of view. Source: Satya Mallick (2016).
Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between the field of view (FOV) of the camera and its
focal length. Satya Mallick (2016) provides an explanation for equation (2.16) that relates








The approximation of 𝑓 by half the image width in pixels is valid if the FOV is close to 50
degrees. The FOV of a standard lens that is used to replicate the view natural to a human
observer typically ranges between 40 and 60 degrees, while wide angle and telephoto lenses
can provide fields of view higher than 180 degrees to lower than 1 degree.
We assume proper alignment of the image sensor by the use of the optical center as the
image center and ignoring the possibility of skewness. An image is skewed when the angle
between the image plane and the optical axis is not exactly 90 degrees. Skewness and
misalignment may occur due to errors in the sensor manufacturing process or damage to
the camera.
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The pinhole camera model does not account for lens distortion. Kannala and Brandt (2006)
present more detailed camera models that account for factors such as skewness and lens
distortion, but these factors often cannot be reliably determined from a single image so the
simple pinhole camera model is used.
With approximations made for the intrinsic parameters of the camera, the head pose is
estimated by choosing rotation matrix 𝑅 and translation vector ®𝑡 to transform the landmark
positions in world coordinates shown in Figure 2.5 to minimize the error when the points are
projected using equation (2.15). This is done by solving the following optimization problem


























This problem can be solved efficiently using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm (Bradski
2000). The resulting rotation matrix 𝑅 is the rotation of the camera relative to the world
coordinates, and the orientation of the head relative to the camera is obtained by 𝑅−1.
For each image, two head poses are estimated. One is based on all of the facial landmarks
and the second is based exclusively on the central facial landmarks. The resulting rotation
matrix and translation vector for the head pose based on all the facial landmarks are denoted
by 𝑅𝑎 and ®𝑡𝑎, while the rotation matrix and translation vector resulting from the head pose
based on the central facial landmarks are denoted 𝑅𝑐 and ®𝑡𝑐. We see how these rotation
matrices and translation vectors are used to develop features for classification in section
2.4, next we take a closer look at the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm used to solve problem
(2.17).
2.3.5 Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm
The Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm is a specialized optimization algorithm designed
to solve nonlinear least squares minimization problems (Marquardt 1963), and is imple-
mented in the analytic to find the optimal head pose estimate. Ranganathan (2004) provides
an introduction to the algorithm and a review of the Gauss-Newton and gradient descent
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optimization methods for context. We provide a similar approach in this section which is
broken into four subsections. First we provide a brief introduction to the Hessian and Jaco-
bian matrices, then discuss the form and advantage of working with least squares problems.
We then review the gradient descent and Gauss-Newton methods, and we finish with the
development of the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
Introduction of the Hessian and Jacobian Matrices
For a scalar valued function 𝑓 , we have the gradient ∇ 𝑓 and Hessian matrix ∇2 𝑓 providing
indications of curvature and slope. The Hessian matrix is the square matrix of the second






























Similarly, for a vector valued function [ 𝑓1(𝑥), 𝑓2(𝑥), ..., 𝑓𝑚 (𝑥)]𝑇 the Jacobian is the matrix












· · · 𝜕 𝑓𝑚
𝜕𝑥𝑛
 (2.19)
Both of these matrices are fundamental tools in many optimization methods, but ∇2 𝑓 can
be difficult to compute if 𝑥 has many components. In the following sections we show how




We now introduce the form of the Least Squares problem and show how ∇2 𝑓 can be
approximated using J, which removes the computational burden of calculating ∇2 𝑓 . Least
squares problems take the form shown in equation (2.20).





In equation (2.20), 𝑥 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, ...., 𝑥𝑛]𝑇 is a vector, and each 𝑟 𝑗 is a function from IR𝑛 to IR.
The 𝑟 𝑗 are referred to as residuals and it is assumed that 𝑚 ≥ 𝑛.
This form can be re-written to make it easier to work with by representing 𝑓 as a residual
vector 𝑟:IR𝑛 → IRm defined by equation (2.21).
𝑟 (𝑥) = [𝑟1(𝑥), 𝑟2(𝑥), ..., 𝑟𝑚 (𝑥)]2 (2.21)
This residual vector allows us to represent 𝑓 as shown in equation (2.22).
𝑓 (𝑥) = 1
2
‖𝑟 (𝑥)‖2 (2.22)
Now the derivatives of 𝑓 can be easily written in terms of the Jacobian J of 𝑟 with respect
to 𝑥, and are shown in equations (2.23) and (2.24)
∇ 𝑓 (𝑥) =
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑟 𝑗 (𝑥)∇𝑟 𝑗 (𝑥) = J(𝑥)𝑇𝑟 (𝑥) (2.23)
∇2 𝑓 (𝑥) = J(𝑥)𝑇J(𝑥) +
𝑚∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑟 𝑗 (𝑥)∇2𝑟 𝑗 (𝑥) (2.24)
The appealing property of least squares problems is that the Hessian ∇2 𝑓 (𝑥) can be deter-
mined easily with J if the 𝑟 𝑗s can be approximated as linear functions making the ∇2𝑟 𝑗 (𝑥)
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small, or if the 𝑟 𝑗s themselves are small. These approximations reduce equation (2.24) to
the equation shown in (2.25).
∇2 𝑓 (𝑥) = J(𝑥)𝑇J(𝑥) (2.25)
Gradient Descent and Gauss-Newton Methods
Gradient descent and the Gauss-Newton methods are simple and intuitive methods for
finding the minima of a function, but they both have disadvantages. In this section we
briefly discuss the two methods, and in the following section we show how the methods
combine to create the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
Gradient descent is the simplest and most intuitive method to find the minima of a function,
where steps are taken in the direction of steepest descent given by the opposite of the
direction of the gradient. The update rule is shown in equation (2.26),where _ is a scalar
representing step length and 𝑖 is the iteration counter.
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑥𝑖 − _∇ 𝑓 (2.26)
Gradient descent fails to account for curvature of the objective function, as quantified by
the use of the Hessian. The Gauss-Newton method forms better local approximations to 𝑓
by using curvature.
The Gauss-Newton method improves upon the simple gradient descent method by incor-
porating curvature as well as gradient information by utilizing the second derivatives. The
update rule for the Gauss-Newton method is based on solving the equation ∇ 𝑓 (𝑥) = 0 by
expanding ∇ 𝑓 using a Taylor series around 𝑥0, resulting in (2.27)
∇ 𝑓 (𝑥) = ∇ 𝑓 (𝑥0) + (𝑥 − 𝑥0)𝑇 ∇2 𝑓 (𝑥0) + higher order terms of (𝑥 − 𝑥0) (2.27)
The update rule is found by neglecting the higher order terms and solving for the minimum
of 𝑓 by setting ∇ 𝑓 (𝑥) = 0 giving us the following rule (2.28)
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∇ 𝑓 (𝑥𝑖) (2.28)
where 𝑥0 has been replaced by 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥 by 𝑥𝑖+1.
Newton’s method is based on a quadratic approximation of 𝑓 since the higher order terms
are ignored in the Taylor series approximation, so the Hessian matrix does not need to
be evaluated exactly. An approximation of the Hessian is sufficient. The advantage of the
Gauss-Newton method is its rapid convergence, but the rate of convergence is sensitive
to the linearity around the starting location. The advantage of Gauss-Newton method over
gradient descent is that, under certain conditions, it has a faster rate of convergence (Adby
2013).
Levenberg-Marquardt Algorithm
Levenberg observed that the simple gradient descent method and Gauss-Newton methods
have complementary advantages, and developed an algorithm to blend the two which is
accomplished by the following update rule shown in equation (2.29).
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑥𝑖 − (𝐻 + _𝐼)−1∇ 𝑓 (𝑥𝑖) (2.29)
where 𝐻 is the Hessian matrix evaluated at 𝑥𝑖, and _ is the factor balancing the effects
of gradient descent and Gauss-Newton methods. The algorithm is implemented using the
following steps:
1. Perform an update using equation (2.29).
2. Evaluate the error at the new parameter vector.
3. If the error has increased as a result of the update, then reset weights to their previous
values and increase _ by a factor of 10 and return to step (1).
4. If the error has decreased as a result of the update, then keep the weights at their new
values and decrease _ by a factor of 10.
This algorithm does provide a balance between the two methods, but if _ gets too large the
effect of gradient descent dominates and the Hessian matrix is not used at all. Marquardt
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developed a modification to the update rule given by equation (2.30), which scales the
component of the gradient based on the second derivatives.
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑥𝑖 − (𝐻 + _ diag[𝐻])−1∇ 𝑓 (𝑥𝑖) (2.30)
This is the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, which scales the gradient based on the curva-
ture. These modifications result better performance because the step size is appropriately
scaled by the curvature of 𝑓 .
The analytic implements the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm to efficiently solve for the two
head pose estimates required to develop the features for classification. To this point we have
reviewed the methods required to develop these head pose estimates from an image. We
proceed in the following section with a more focused discussion of how the original model
was trained by taking a closer look at the data used as well as the classifier and features that
were selected for implementation in the analytic.
2.4 Classification
We conclude this chapter by following the development, along with the justifications and
results that Yang et al. (2019) present in the original paper. This discussion provides context
for the review of fundamental assumptions and claims in chapter 3. We start by reviewing
the data, and then followwith a presentation of the training process including discussions on
feature selection and opt outs and special considerations. We have also included a review of
the results presented by the authors and a summary of their interpretations. We conclude the
chapter with a brief mathematical introduction to the classifier implemented in the analytic.
2.4.1 The Data
Yang et al. (2019) developed the analytic using the University of Albany DeepFake Video
(UADFV) data set which they created in their previous work (Li et al. 2018b). The data set
consists of 49 real videos and each one has a corresponding DeepFake video with the face
of Nicolas Cage swapped. The average length of the videos is 11.14 seconds and the typical
resolution is 294 x 500 pixels. Three sample frames are provided in Figure 2.7, and you can
see that as individual frames the fakes can be convincing.
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Figure 2.7. Sample frames from the UADFV data set. Source: Li et al.
(2018b).
The data set are exclusively videos, and some DeepFakes are easily classified by eye due to
fluctuations in the position of the synthesized region of the face from one frame to the next.
This is especially apparent when the actor rotates their head. While the videos may not be
convincing to the eye, the analytic processes each frame individually, so it does not pick up
on these fluctuations the way a viewer would.
The performance of the analytic was validated using a subset of images from the DARPA
MediFor GAN Image/Video Challenge (DARPA GAN) data set consisting of 241 real
images and 252 DeepFake images. Overall the quality was much lower in the DARPA GAN
data set, many of the fakes are blurry and several images appear to be subsequent frames in
a video making the data set effectively much smaller.
2.4.2 Training the Classifier
The analytic estimates two head poses from each image, one based on all of the facial
landmarks and a second based on only the central facial landmarks. These two head pose
estimates result rotation matrices 𝑅𝑎 and 𝑅𝑐 along with translation vectors ®𝑡𝑎 and ®𝑡𝑐. The
analytic creates the head orientation vector ®𝑣 and the Rodrigues’ vector ®𝑟 from the rotation
matrix as alternative representations of the orientation of the head. The head orientation
vectors are unit vectors obtained by ®𝑣𝑎 = 𝑅𝑇𝑎 ®𝑤 and ®𝑣𝑐 = 𝑅𝑇𝑐 ®𝑤, where ®𝑤 = [0, 0, 1]𝑇 is the unit
vector in the direction of 𝑧-axis in world coordinates which points outward from the center
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of the face. The head orientation vectors are shown in Figure 2.1 as the vectors pointing
from the nose of each individual. The Rodrigues vector ®𝑟 is the same rotation represented
by the rotation matrix 𝑅, but in the form of a three-dimensional vector. Piña (2011) provides
an introduction to representing rotations using the Rodrigues vector.
Yang et al. (2019) tested the analytic on several combinations of these features to determine
the best performancewith a SupportVectorMachine (SVM) classifier. Table 2.2 summarizes
the results of the tests, and shows that as expected the performance improves as more
descriptive features are provided to the SVM. The difference of the head orientation vectors
only capture the rotation of the 𝑧-axis, so performance improves as the orientation is
described fully using the rotation matrix or Rodrigues vector. The flattened difference
between the rotation matrices 𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑐 along with the difference between the translation
vectors ®𝑡𝑎 − ®𝑡𝑐 are the best performing set of features and were selected for implementation
in the analytic.
Features Frame Video
®𝑣𝑎 − ®𝑣𝑐 0.738 0.888
®𝑟𝑎 − ®𝑟𝑐 0.798 0.898
𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑐 0.853 0.913
( ®𝑣𝑎 − ®𝑣𝑐)&( ®𝑡𝑎 − ®𝑡𝑐) 0.840 0.949
( ®𝑟𝑎 − ®𝑟𝑐)&( ®𝑡𝑎 − ®𝑡𝑐) 0.866 0.954
(𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑐)&( ®𝑡𝑎 − ®𝑡𝑐) 0.840 0.949
Table 2.2. Area under the ROC curve based on videos and frames.
Source: Yang et al. (2019).
2.4.3 Opt Outs and Special Considerations
The analytic processes videos by evaluating each frame and returning a cumulative proba-
bility that the image is a DeepFake by averaging of probabilities of each individual frame.
The analytic is not always capable of analyzing every single frame in a video, because of
its dependence on the frontal face detector and shape predictor from dlib. If the actor in
the frame is not facing the camera, the frontal face detector is not able detect a face and the
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Figure 2.8. ROC curves showing the original classification results.
Source: Yang et al. (2019).
analytic opts out and the frame is ignored. If a face is detected but no landmark positions
can be determined, the frame is classified as fake with probability 1. These factors show
the strong dependence of the analytic on the performance on the frontal face detector and
shape predictor. If these methods fail or malfunction, the performance of the analytic is not
reliable.
2.4.4 Results
The analytic shows promising results on both the UADFV and DARPA GAN data sets, and
we provide a summary of how Yang et al. (2019) performed the tests and interpreted their
results. They first created a training and testing set from the UADFV data set. The frames
were extracted from the videos and labeled real or fake based on the videos they were drawn
from. Then a support vector machine (SVM) with a radial basis function (RBF) kernel was
trained on the frames from the training set. The authors tested the analytic by classifying the
individual frames in the testing set, and conducted a second test by classifying the images
in the DARPA GAN data set. 2.8 summarizes the results as receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves, which are drawn from the original paper. The authors claim that the analytic
performs worse on the DARPAGAN images because the synthesized portions of the images
are often blurry making it difficult for the landmark positions to be determined accurately.
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2.4.5 Support Vector Machine
Previous sections demonstrate how the analytic was developed and trained, next we give
a brief introduction to the theoretical concepts behind a support vector machine classifier.
Whitaker (2020) provides an introduction to the foundational concepts. We focus our at-
tention on the development of radial basis functions, and begin by working with a simple
case where we build a linear decision boundary between classes that are linearly separable
then extend that method to include the non-separable case. Followed by an introduction to
the concept of basis functions and using them to build non-linear decision boundaries. We
finish with a discussion of radial basis functions, since they are used in the support vector
machine classifier for this analytic.
Linear Decision Boundaries
In itsmost basic form, the support vectormachine is used to create a linear decision boundary
between two classes. As an example, consider a set of 𝑛 data points with two predictors 𝑥1
and 𝑥2 and 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {−1, 1} indicating class membership that are linearly separable. The linear
decision boundary takes the form of equation (2.31).
𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑥1 + 𝑏2𝑥2 (2.31)
We define the optimal choice for the linear decision boundary as the one that maximizes the
margin between the observations and the boundary. For convenience we define the vector
®𝑏 = [𝑏0, 𝑏1, 𝑏2]. The coefficients defining a linear decision boundary are not unique so we









Since it doesn’t matter what ‖®𝑏‖ is, we set ‖®𝑏‖ = 1
𝑀
to transform it into a quadratic





s.t. 𝑦𝑖 (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑥2𝑖) ≥ 1
(2.33)
This formulation can be generalized to deal with the non-separable case by replacing the
constraint with a penalty for points on the wrong side of the boundary. The penalty is equal





𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 1 − 𝑦𝑖 (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑥2𝑖)) (2.34)
Non-Linear Decision Boundaries
Non-linear boundaries can be created by extending the basis. The basis is the collection of
real-valued functions of inputs that are used to generate features that are to be combined
in a linear function. We demonstrate this by defining a quadratic polynomial basis for our
example. Let ℎ1( ®𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥1𝑖, ℎ2( ®𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥2𝑖, ℎ3( ®𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥1𝑖𝑥2𝑖, ℎ4( ®𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥21𝑖, and ℎ5( ®𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥
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2𝑖. The





max(0, 1 − 𝑦𝑖 (𝑏0 + 𝑏1ℎ1( ®𝑥𝑖) + 𝑏2ℎ2( ®𝑥𝑖) + 𝑏3ℎ3( ®𝑥𝑖) + 𝑏4ℎ4( ®𝑥𝑖))
(2.35)
Another example is a radial basis function kernel which consists of Gaussian radial basis
functions. RBFs are centered at each of the observations in the training set, so there is a
total of 𝑛 features in the basis. The basis functions are given by equation (2.36).
ℎ𝑖 (®𝑥) = exp{−𝛾‖®𝑥 − ®𝑥𝑖‖2} (2.36)
The function ℎ( ®𝑥𝑖) indicates whether the new data point ®𝑥 is in the neighborhood of ®𝑥. The
magnitude of 𝛾 controls the size of these neighborhoods, large 𝛾 makes the peaks higher







max(0, 1 − 𝑦𝑖 (𝑏0 + 𝑏1ℎ1(®𝑥) + 𝑏2ℎ2(®𝑥) + ... + 𝑏𝑛ℎ𝑛 (®𝑥)))
(2.37)
In practice we solve the dual of the formulation shown in problem (2.37) since only the inner
products between the observations in the new space are required, rather than computing
all of the new coordinates. This is known as the "kernel trick" and reduces the amount
of computation required. A downside of the of the RBF kernel is that all of the training
data points must be retained with the model since they are required to compute the inner
products, but are a good choice if no prior knowledge of the structure of the data is known.
2.4.6 Conclusion
Chapter 2 has provided a review of the analytic including the methods used to process the
image, the feature selection process, and the data used to train and test the model. We also
presented the theoretical background required to understand the optimization method used
to select the head pose estimates, and the SVM to classify the images. The next chapter
presents problems that we uncovered through our research that leads us to doubt some
fundamental assumptions and claims asserted in the development of the analytic. We show
how these problems effect both the training and performance of the analytic, and cast doubt
on its utility as a DeepFake detector.
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The goal of this chapter is to show that three assumptions fundamental to the development
of the analytic are false. The first assumption is that the estimated position of the outer
landmarks are unaffected by themanipulations to the interior region of the face in aDeepFake
face swap. The second assumption is that the optimization method the analytic uses is
appropriate for estimating the head pose, and the final assumption is that the performance of
the analytic generalizes across individuals as presented by the authors in their experiments.
We use the insight gained from the discussion of these assumptions to interpret the results
of our experiments that we present in the next chapter.
3.1 Landmark Position Estimation
The analytic takes advantage of the fact that in a DeepFake face swap only the inner region of
the face is manipulated leaving the outer region unchanged. The analytic assumes that since
the outer region of the face is unchanged, the estimated positions of the outer landmarks in
this region are also unchanged. In this section we begin by presenting images as evidence
that this assumption is not true, and then break down the operation of the method used to
estimate facial landmarks as justification.
3.1.1 Example Demonstrating Dependence Between Facial Landmark
Position Estimates
Figure 3.1 contains a pair of images Kazemi and Sullivan (2014) presented in their paper
proposing the landmark position estimation algorithm that is implemented in the analytic.
Each image contains a face with the estimated facial landmark positions shown as yellow
dots. You can see that in both images several outer landmarks are blocked from the view of
the camera by the hands in the image, but their positions are still estimated. This implies
that the estimated positions of these landmarks, which are blocked from the view of the
camera, are dependent on the estimated position of other landmarks. We take a closer look
at the algorithm used in the analytic to estimate the position of the facial landmarks in the
next section to demonstrate why this occurs.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1. Photos illustrating dependence of facial landmark position
estimates. The positions of the outer facial landmarks are estimated
despite being blocked from the view of the camera by the hand in both
images. Source: Kazemi and Sullivan (2014).
3.1.2 Summary of the Algorithm Used to Estimate Landmark Posi-
tions
This section presents the landmark position estimation algorithm developed by Kazemi and
Sullivan (2014).We first introduce the overall structure of themodel as a tree-based classifier
along with other context necessary to understand the implementation of the algorithm. We
then take a closer look at how split tests are designed to be shape invariant, and how splitting
rules are determined in the training process. The overall goal of this section is to provide
justification for the implications for the analytic presented in the next section.
This algorithm precisely estimates the position of the 68 facial landmarks in a computation-
ally efficient manner by using a cascade of tree based regressors. We begin our discussion
by introducing some terminology. Let x𝑖 ∈ IR2 be the 𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinates of the 𝑖th facial
landmark in an image 𝐼. We then define the shape vector S = [x𝑇1 , x
𝑇
2 , ..., x
𝑇
68], which denotes
the coordinates of all 68 facial landmarks in 𝐼. The algorithm is trained on data consisting of
pairs of images and shape vectors (𝐼1, S1), (𝐼2, S2), ..., (𝐼𝑛, S𝑛). The mean shape S̄ is defined
as the average of the shape vectors in the training set, and is used to initialize the algorithm.
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The landmark detection technique refines, for a fixed number of iterations𝑇 , the mean shape
S̄ ∈ IR68×2 used as an initial estimate of the pixel coordinates for the 68 facial landmarks.
At each iteration, 𝑘 , the landmark positions are updated as
Ŝ𝑘+1 = Ŝ𝑘 + 𝛾 𝑟𝑘 (Ŝ𝑘 , 𝐼) (3.1)
where
• Ŝ𝑘+1 is the estimate of the landmark positions after iteration 𝑘




𝑟𝑘 : IR68×2 × IR𝑚×𝑛 → IR68×2
}𝑇
𝑘=1 is a sequence of random forest regression func-
tions.
• 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1) is a shrinkage parameter, commonly used in boosted forests to mitigate
overtraining.
The algorithm trains each tree based regressor 𝑟𝑘 via gradient boosting with a squared error
loss function. At each split node in the regression trees, a decision is made based on the
difference between the intensities of two pixels. The position of the two pixels are defined by
coordinates measured relative to the mean shape to improve the geometric invariance of the
process. The algorithm determines the position of the pixels in the image by transforming
the coordinates using the similarity transformation that is described in the next section. This
transformation is the computationally expensive and is conducted once at each level in the
cascade to maximize the speed of the algorithm. Next we take a closer look at how each
tree based regressor is trained in the model, and how split tests are performed.
3.1.3 Tree based regressor
Each regression function 𝑟𝑘 is composed of regression trees fit to residual targets as part of
the gradient boosting algorithm. In the following subsections we look more closely at how
the split tests are made shape invariant, as well as how the node splits are chosen. These
details are used in the next section to justify why the estimated position of the outer facial
landmarks are affected by manipulations to the inner region of the face.
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Shape invariant split tests
As described by Kazemi and Sullivan (2014), the regression trees make a decision at each
split node based on the difference between the intensities of two pixels. These pixels are
defined by the coordinates u and v measured relative to the mean shape S̄. The position of
these pixels in the image 𝐼 are found by using the similarity transformation that transforms
Ŝ𝑘 to S̄.
The steps to determine the transformation are as follows. Let x𝑘u be the facial landmark in
the mean shape that is closest to u. The offset from u is defined in equation (3.2).
𝛿xu = u − x𝑘u (3.2)
Then for a shape Ŝ𝑘 in image 𝐼 , the position u′ in image 𝐼 that is qualitatively similar to the
position of u relative to the mean shape is given by equation (3.3), and the equation for v′
is similarly defined.




The scale 𝑠 and rotation matrix 𝑅 are from the similarity transformation that transforms Ŝ𝑘





x 𝑗 − (𝑠𝑅x 𝑗 + t)2 (3.4)
Solving problem (3.4) is the most computationally expensive part of the algorithm, so it
is only done once at each level of the cascade. We can see in Figure 3.2 that the initial
estimates of the shape have high error, this means that the position relative to the true shape
for the pixels in the image used for comparison differ greatly from the relative positions that
were intended when defining the split test. As the cascade progresses, the shape estimate
improves and the relative positions of the pixels match more closely resulting in more
effective tests.
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Figure 3.2. Figure depicting the progression of landmark position esti-
mation at separate levels of the cascade. Shifting occurs to both inner
and outer landmarks in initial levels of the cascade, while more fo-
cused corrections occur in later levels. Source: Kazemi and Sullivan
(2014).
The split test is defined using three parameters, \ = (𝜏, u, v) where 𝜏 is the threshold for the












Each regression tree approximates residuals with a piecewise constant function by fitting a
constant vector to each leaf node. Due to the large number of potential splits, the regression
trees were trained by randomly generating a set of candidate splits, \s, at each node, and
then choosing the \∗ that minimizes the sum of squared error.
3.1.4 Implications for the Analytic
One of the foundational assumptions for the analytic is that the estimated position of the
outer landmarks are unaffected by manipulations to the inner facial region of a DeepFake
face swap. The assumption is false because the analytic determines the position of the facial
landmarks by comparing the intensities of pairs of pixels that have been chosen at random
in the training process. There is no condition that the pixel intensities used to estimate




Figure 3.3. Photos illustrating that the estimated position of the outer
landmarks are affected by manipulations of the inner facial region.
Sources: @CelebsWith (Jan 20, 2014) and Flickr Faces Karras et al.
(2019).
the regression trees used to update the estimated shape predict residual vectors that update
the entire shape. This means that the analytic does not estimate the landmark positions
individually, instead they are estimated together.
Figure 3.3 provides an example. In images (a) and (b), we have an image where the inner
facial region has been manipulated. The images (c) and (d) on the same figure have a similar
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pose and have not been manipulated. The estimated facial landmarks are shown in (b) and
(d) with the central facial landmarks in red, while the outer facial landmarks are shown in
blue. The outer facial landmarks in image (d) are at the outer edge of the face, while in
image (b) the outer landmarks have been drawn in towards the center of the face. This shows
that the estimated position of the outer landmarks are affected by the manipulations to the
inner region of the face.
The assumption that the estimated position of the outer landmarks are not affected by the
manipulation of the inner region of the face in a DeepFake face swap is a fundamental
assumption for the analytic. Without the assumption, we cannot rely on the estimated
position of the outer facial landmarks to retain the pose of the original image. This makes it
unclear whether the comparison of the estimated head poses is a useful predictor to classify
DeepFakes.
3.2 Head Pose Estimation Problem
Our goal in this section is to show that the optimization method the analytic uses is not
appropriate for head pose estimation. We show how the optimization method can become
trapped in a local minimum resulting in head poses that are selected facing away from the
camera. For simplicity, we refer to this mistake as a flipped pose. As motivation for the
following sections, we begin by demonstrating the consequences of the mistake by showing
a flipped pose projected onto an image. We then provide a brief review of the formulation
of the optimization problem as it was introduced in section 2.3.4, to provide context for the
discussion of why the flipped poses occur. We finish by taking a look at the implications for
the analytic when one of the two poses selected for an image is a flipped pose.
3.2.1 The Problem
Figure 3.4 includes two photos of Nicolas Cage. We added the estimated facial landmark
positions to each photo in blue along with the points projected onto the image based on
the estimated head pose in orange. The orange and blue points align closely in photo (a)
while they are not as closely aligned in image (b), especially around the chin and outer edge
of the face. This indicates that there is a problem with the head pose estimation process,
because we have the same actor with similar poses and significantly different results. In the
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Figure 3.4. Photos of Nicolas Cage illustrating the effects of the opti-
mization algorithm terminating in a local minimum. The estimated fa-
cial landmark positions are shown in orange, while the projected posi-
tions based on the head pose are shown in blue. You can see that the
fit is better in (a) than in (b), especially around the chin. Source: Eliza
Berman (2015)
next section we revisit the head pose estimation problem and show how these poses were
selected.
3.2.2 Review of the Head Pose Estimation Problem
Recall from section 2.3.4 that the analytic estimates the head pose by choosing rotation
matrix 𝑅 and translation vector ®𝑡 to project the landmark positions in world coordinates,
shown in Figure 2.5, to pixel coordinates in the image plane using equation (2.15). It then
chooses the head pose to minimize the error between the projected points in the image plane




























The analytic estimates two head poses for each image, one based on all of the facial
landmarks, and the second based exclusively on the central facial landmarks. We denote
the resulting rotation matrix and translation vector for the head pose based on all the facial
landmarks by 𝑅𝑎 and ®𝑡𝑎, while we use 𝑅𝑐 and ®𝑡𝑐 to denote the rotation matrix and translation
vector resulting from the head pose based on the central facial landmarks. The analytic
utilizes the solvePnP method from opencv (Bradski 2000) to solve problem (3.6),
which develops an initial solution by using the direct linear transform (DLT) method.
3.2.3 Head Pose Visualization
Here, we take a moment to describe a method that we commonly use in the following
sections to visualize the head pose. We build this visualization by using equation (3.7)
to transform the landmarks from world coordinates to camera coordinates and then plot
the results. Figure 3.5 shows the effect, where (a) depicts the landmark positions in world
coordinates, and (b) is the desired visualizationwith the landmark positions shown in camera










 + ®𝑡 (3.7)
3.2.4 Optimization trapped in a Local Minimum
The analytic initializes the Levenberg-Marquardt optimization algorithm by utilizing the
DLT method to solve for the least squares solution of the system of homogeneous equations
that includes equation (3.8) for each landmark position. The DLT method is a relaxed


































Figure 3.5. Figures illustrating transformation from world to camera co-
ordinates. Figure (a) contains landmark positions in world coordinates
based on the average face, while figure (b) shows the landmark posi-
tions in camera coordinates with the camera aperture represented by
the origin in purple.
best satisfy the system of homogeneous equations, but does not require the matrix 𝑅 to
be a rotation matrix. The matrix 𝑅 is then projected onto the space of rotation matrices to
provide a rotation matrix for the initial solution. As a result, the analytic may initialize the


















ª®®®¬ = 0 (3.8)
Figure 3.6 shows visualizations of the head poses that were selected for the images in Figure
3.4 at the beginning of the section. We can see in (b) that the pose is facing away from the
camera, while the pose in (a) is facing towards the camera. It is most important to notice
among many differences there is a rotation of 180 degrees about the 𝑍-axis along with
the difference in translation along the 𝑍-axis between the poses in Figures 3.6 (a) and (b).
While these are drastically different approximations of the head pose, they result in similar
projections into the image plane.
When the analytic uses equation (3.9) to project the landmarks in camera coordinates into
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pixel coordinates on the image plane. The landmark positions shown in Figures 3.6 (a)
and (b) result in similar projections in pixel coordinates. This is because the difference in
translation along the 𝑍-axis results in opposite signs for the 𝑍-coordinates of each landmark,
and the 180-degree difference in rotation between the poses results in opposite signs for
each of the 𝑋 and 𝑌 coordinates. These opposite signs are canceled in the fractions in
equation (3.9), but the primary differences in the projections in the image plane are caused
by the differences in magnitude of the 𝑍-coordinates. In Figure 3.6 (a) the tip of the nose is
closer to the camera and has a 𝑍 coordinate with smaller magnitude, while in (b) the outer
edge of the face is closer to the camera aperture giving those landmarks 𝑍 coordinates with
smaller magnitudes. The projection resulting from the flipped pose have wide cheeks when
compared to the correct pose because the lower magnitude for the 𝑍-coordinates produce
















































Figure 3.6. 3D plots illustrating the effects of the optimization algorithm
terminating in a local minimum. Head poses selected based on all
facial landmarks are shown in camera coordinates in blue. Notice the
pose in (b) is facing away from the aperture of the camera represented
by the origin.
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Figure 3.7. Figure illustrating the concept of a flipped head pose. The
estimated position of the facial landmarks is shown in (a) while the
head pose based on all facial landmarks is shown in blue in (b) and
the head pose based on central facial landmarks are shown in red in
(b).
3.3 Flipped Pose
We now present how this error in head pose selection has significant implications for the
analytic when the error occurs on one of two head poses selected for a given image. Figure
3.7 (a) shows an image with the estimated landmark positions from dlib shown in orange.
Figure 3.7 (b) are visualizations of the two poses that were chosen by the optimization
algorithm with the blue pose chosen based on all of the facial landmarks and the red pose
chosen based on the central facial landmarks. The optimization algorithm terminated in a
local minimum when selecting the blue pose leaving it facing away from the camera. We
can see that these poses differ significantly and the differences are reflected in the flattened
difference in the rotation matrices 𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑐 and the flattened difference in translation vectors
𝑡𝑎 − 𝑡𝑐 used to classify the image. These differences have consistently large magnitudes
regardless of which of the two poses are flipped. In section 4.1.2 we explore the occurrence
of the flipped poses in the UADFV data set, along with its implications for the training of
the analytic and classification of the frames.
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3.4 Generalizable Results
The goal of this section is to show by way of experimental results that the performance of
the analytic does not generalize across new individuals. We begin by presenting the authors’
results, and then reveal patterns in the data sets that improperly inflate the performance of
the model. The remaining portions explain how these patterns influence the way the analytic
classifies frames and present experimental results supporting these claims.
3.4.1 Author’s Results
Figure 3.8. ROC curves showing the original classification results.
Source: Yang et al. (2019).
Figure 3.8 shows that the analytic performed well on both the UADFV data set as well as
the subset from the DARPA GAN challenge data set. These results are undermined by the
fact that the UADFV data set features Nicolas Cage’s face exclusively in each of the fake
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videos, and a large portion of the fake images in the DARPA GAN challenge data set are
blurry. The remainder of this section demonstrates that these patterns make it easier for the
analytic to classify DeepFakes in these data sets.
3.4.2 Blurry Images
The landmark estimation algorithm works by comparing the intensities of pairs of pixels in
the image. Blurry portions of an image can interfere with these comparisons by blending
the shadows preventing the landmark estimation algorithm from converging to the proper
solution. Figure 3.9 illustrates the effect of progressively increasing the blurriness in the
inner region of the face on the facial landmark estimates. The level of disruption to the
facial landmark estimates depends on the pose of the face, along with shadows present
in the background. If the head pose is far from the mean head pose used to initialize
the algorithm, it is possible that pixels from outside of the face are used for comparison
interfering with the estimation of the facial landmarks. If the background contains a shadow
of the face or a similar edge, the algorithm can mistakenly outline this portion of the image
as a feature of the face. These disruptions of the landmark estimation algorithm lead the
analytic to create inaccurate head pose estimates that result in the analytic classifying the
image as a DeepFake.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 3.9. Photos illustrating the effect of blurring on estimated facial
landmark position. Original photo in (a), original photo with landmarks
in (b) increasing amounts of blurring to the facial region in (c) through
(f) : Source- Karras et al. (2019)
3.4.3 Nicolas Cage Bias
We present an experiment to explore the effect of using Nicolas Cage exclusively in the fake
videos in the UADFV data set. The experiment is conducted on a new data set consisting
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of 100 photos scraped from a Google image search. Half of the photos contain Nicolas
Cage, while the other half do not. While none of the images are DeepFakes, we use the
model trained by the authors to attempt to classify the images containing Nicolas Cage.
The experiment relies on the presence of bias in the training of the model to cause the
analytic to classify images of Nicolas Cage as fake. Figure 3.10 summarizes the results of
this experiment as a ROC curve.

















Nick Cage, auc: 0.71
Figure 3.10. ROC curve showing the results of using the orignal model
as a Nicolas Cage detector.
The resulting area under the curve (AUC) for this experiment is .71, which indicates that
there is a strong bias in the training of the model. The presence of the bias is important
because it shows that the analytic can generate bias towards individuals in the training set,
as well as the fact that the bias inflated the performance of the analytic in the author’s
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experiment on the UADFV data set.
3.5 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, we show that three assumptions fundamental to the development
of the analytic are false. The first assumption is that the estimated position of the outer
landmarks are unaffected by the manipulations to the inner region of the face in a DeepFake
face swap. We present an example of an image with manipulations restricted to the inner
region of the face that result in changes to the estimated position of the outer facial region.
Section 3.1.2 provides a detailed description of the landmark estimation algorithm, which
supports our conclusion that contradicts the authors’ assumption. The second assumption
is that the optimization method the analytic uses is appropriate for estimating the head
pose. We show that the analytic may choose head poses that face away from the camera,
which are clearly not appropriate approximations. The third and final assumption is that
the performance of the analytic generalizes across individuals with the same performance
the authors present from their experiments. We present patterns in the data sets used in the





The purpose of this chapter is to show that exceptional performance of the analytic on the
UADFV data set is due to the distribution of features caused by the flipped head poses,
and demonstrate through experimental results that the performance of the analytic does
not generalize to new data sets. We take a close look at the UADFV data set including
the distribution of features both before and after the head poses are corrected. Next we
describe the new data sets that we utilize in our experiments along with the methods we use
to develop training and testing sets. We finish by presenting the results of our experiments
showing that the performance of the analytic does not generalize to these new data sets with
or without corrected head poses.
4.1 Classification Performance on the UADFV Data Set
This section demonstrates that the exceptional performance of the analytic on the UADFV
data set is due to the distribution of the rotation matrix and translation vector features
caused by the flipped head poses. The first subsection shows that we are able to replicate
the performance presented by Yang et al. (2019) in their paper, and then demonstrate that
the train test split leads to optimistic results. We then describe how we modify the analytic
to correct flipped head poses, and then proceed to show how the value of both the rotation
matrix and translation vector features are diminishedwhen the head poses are corrected. The
section concludeswith a presentation of results that show how the classification performance
drops when the head poses are corrected.
4.1.1 Replication of Author’s Results
In our first experiment we successfully train a model using the training set provided by the
authors, and replicate the results Yang et al. (2019) present in their paper. Figure 4.1 shows
our results. The success of this experiment shows that we are able to correctly train and
implement the analytic.
We explore the performance of the model further by repeating this replication experiment
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Performance on the UADFV Testing Set
Video ROC, auc: 0.980
Frame ROC, auc: 0.891
(a)
















Performance on the DARPA Data Set
Image ROC, auc: 0.792
(b)
Figure 4.1. ROC curves showing the results of our experiment repli-
cating the results presented by the author on both the UADFV (a) and
the subset of the DARPA GAN challenge data set (b).
30 times utilizing a randomly selected training and testing split in each trial. Figure 4.2
summarizes the results of this new experiment. The red line represents the results presented
by the authors, and show that the author’s choice of the training and testing split create
optimistic results. While the results of this experiment do not completely discredit the
effectiveness of the analytic, it does lead us to second guess the generalizability of the












Figure 4.2. Boxplot summarizing 30 experiments with random train test
splits from the UADFV data set.
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4.1.2 Correcting Flipped Poses
In order to better understand the effect of the flipped poses on the classification results,
we modify the analytic to correct for head poses facing away from the camera by first
detecting the incorrect pose, and then re-initializing the optimization algorithm with a
pose facing the camera. The modified analytic detects incorrect poses by checking the 𝑧
component of the translation vector that was selected using the solvePnP method. If the
𝑧 component is positive, the pose is facing away from the camera and requires correction,
otherwise the pose does not require correction. The poses are corrected by re-initializing the
solvePnPmethod with the same translation vector with opposite sign for the 𝑧 component
and an additional 180-degree rotation around the 𝑧-axis. This new pose used to initialize the
algorithm is close enough to the correct head pose that the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm
successfully converges to a head pose facing towards the camera.
4.1.3 Effect of Flipped Poses on Classification
The modified analytic allows us to correct head poses that are facing away from the camera,
as well as track the number of corrections that were required. Figure 4.3 shows the number
of frames in the UADFV data set that require zero, one, or two pose corrections. The color
of the bars indicate whether the frames are drawn from a real or DeepFake video. This plot
indicates that a vast majority of the frames in the UADFV data set require one or more pose
corrections, and a majority of the frames requiring a single pose correction are drawn from
the DeepFake videos.
We have seen in section 3.2.4 that the frames requiring a single pose correction result in
head pose estimates that differ significantly. Figure 4.4 provides an example of a frame from
the UADFV data set that requires a single pose correction, and we can see the significant
difference in the estimated head poses in Figure 4.4(b). These differences are reflected in

























Figure 4.3. Barplot showing the number of frames requiring pose cor-
rections in the UADFV data set.






















Figure 4.4. Figure illustrating the concept of a flipped head pose. The
estimated position of the facial landmarks is shown in (a) while the
head pose based on all facial landmarks is shown in blue in (b) and
the head pose based on central facial landmarks are shown in red in
(b).
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Our next step is to use multiple plots to illustrate how the flipped poses affect the distribution
of the features across the testing set. The scatter plot included in Figure 4.5(a) shows the
frames from the UADFV data set plotted based on the 𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑧 components of the
translation vector feature that are used by the analytic for classification. The points are
colored based on the type of video the frames are drawn from, with purple corresponding to
fake frames, and yellow corresponding to real frames. Figure 4.5(b) is a similar scatter plot,
but the colors are based on the number of pose corrections that were required in each frame.
The purple points require a single correction, green points require two corrections, and red
frames require zero corrections. When considered together, these figures show that the two
classes of images are well separated based on the translation vector feature alone, but this
separation is primarily caused by the flipped poses that occur among the fake frames.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.5. 3D Plots illustrating the distribution of the 3 dimensional
translation vector feature in the UADFV testing set. Purple points in
plot (a) correspond to fake frames, while yellow points correspond to
real frames. Purple points in plot (b) correspond to frames requiring a
single pose correction, while green points correspond to frames requir-
ing two pose corrections, and red points representing frames requiring
zero pose corrections.
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Figure 4.6 (a) shows the distribution of the 𝑧-component of the translation vector feature
when the feature is determined without correcting poses that face away from the camera.
Similar to the barplot in Figure 4.3 the boxplots are categorized by the number of poses that
require correction, and are colored by the type of video from which they originated. You
can see that the fake frames that require a single pose correction have 𝑧 components that
are large and negative. Figure 4.6(b) is organized in the same manner, but shows the value
of the 𝑧-component of the translation vector feature when it is calculated after correcting
poses that face away from the camera. Considering the two plots together we can see that
correcting the head pose reduces the magnitude of the 𝑧 component in most of the frames
and diminishes the distinction between the fake frames requiring a single pose correction












































Figure 4.6. Boxplots illustrating the change in the distribution of the
𝑧-component of the translation vector feature after the poses are cor-
rected in the UADFV data set.
This section has shown that the value of the translation vector feature is diminished once
the head poses are corrected. Similarly for the rotation matrix when a single pose correction
is required, an approximately 180-degree difference in rotation about the 𝑧-axis exists
between the two poses. The correction of the pose facing away from the camera removes
this difference in rotation, diminishing the value of the rotation matrix feature. In the next
section we discuss the cosine distance feature that Yang et al. (2019) presents as evidence
to support the validity of using inconsistent head poses to classify DeepFakes.
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4.1.4 Cosine Distance
Yang et al. (2019) presents the cosine distance between head orientation vectors as evidence
of inconsistencies between the estimated head poses that develop as a result of a DeepFake
face swap. In this section we review the definition of head orientation vectors, and show how
the cosine distance is calculated. We then present the distribution of the cosine distances in
the UADFV data set both before and after the correction of the head poses, and ultimately
show that the cosine distance cannot be used to reliably distinguish between real and
DeepFake videos.
We begin with the definition of the head orientation vectors given by equations (4.1) and
(4.2).
®𝑣𝑎 = 𝑅𝑇𝑎 ®𝑤 (4.1)
®𝑣𝑐 = 𝑅𝑇𝑐 ®𝑤 (4.2)
The vector ®𝑤 = [0, 0, 1]𝑇 points from the center of the face outward through the nose along
the 𝑧 axis, and the head orientation is the vector that results from applying the rotation
matrix to ®𝑤. The cosine distance between head orientation vectors give an indication of the
difference in the directions that these two vectors are pointing, and is given by equation
(4.7). Vectors pointing in the same direction have cosine distance close to 0, while vectors
pointing in opposite directions have a cosine distance of 2.
𝑑 = 1 − ®𝑣𝑎 · ®𝑣𝑐‖®𝑣𝑎‖‖®𝑣𝑐‖
(4.3)
The authors presented Figure 4.7 (a) in their paper, and it shows kernel density estimates
(KDE) that approximate the distribution of cosine distances between head orientation vectors
from a subset of the frames in the UADFV data set. The blue KDE represents the distribution
for real frames, and the red KDE represents the distribution for DeepFake frames. Figure
4.7 (b) and (c) are boxplots that we created, and are organized in the same manner as those
in Figure 4.6 in the previous section. These boxplots show that there is no meaningful
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difference in the distribution of the cosine distance between head orientation vectors when









































Figure 4.7. Plot (a) was presented by Yang et al. (2019) and shows
the distribution of cosine distances for frames drawn from a subset of
the UADFV data set. Plots (b) and (c) show that we do not see this
cosine distance trend when considering the entire UADFV data set
either before or after the poses are corrected.
The flipped poses do not have a considerable impact on the cosine distance metric. This is
because a flipped pose is facing in the same direction as a correct pose, but is on the wrong
side of the camera. This shows that the metric is not as effective as the authors intend.
In summary, wewere unable to reproduce the plot in Figure 4.7 (a). It is worth noting that the
authors use "a subset" of DeepFakes to generate this plot. Despite our inability to identify
what subset of data the authors used for this plot, we did not detect a similar trend in any
of the data sets considered throughout our work using either the uncorrected or corrected
version of the analytic. Also, this is a poor metric because it is unable to detect the flipped
head poses, which look the same direction but are on opposite sides of the camera.
4.1.5 Classification Results with Corrected Poses
Throughout this section we have shown how the correction of the flipped poses affect
the distribution of features in the UADFV data set. Figure 4.8 presents the results of an
experiment utilizing the same training and testing split developed by the author to show how
the correction of flipped poses affect classification performance. The newmodel was trained
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ROC Performance on UADFV
New Model Corrected Poses, auc: 0.88
Original Model Uncorrected Poses, auc: 0.97
Figure 4.8. ROC curve showing the effect of correcting the head poses
on classification performance on the UADFV data set.
and tested on the author’s train test split with corrected head poses, while the results of the
original model match those presented by Yang et al. (2019) in the paper. We can see that
the performance of the analytic drops with the implementation of the corrected pose, but an
AUC of .88 indicates that the analytic performs as a worthwhile classifier on the UADFV
data set. We attribute this performance to the overtraining of the analytic on Nicolas Cage
as section 3.4.3 demonstrates. We present the results of a series of experiments on new data
sets to further evaluate the performance of the analytic in the following section.
4.2 Descriptions of the Data Sets
Here, we provide a brief description of each data set that we used in our experiments. We
include basic information such as the size of the data set, source of the videos and actors,
number of manipulation techniques implemented, along with a subjective assessment of
the quality of the DeepFakes. The goal is to provide enough context to understand the
development of the train test splits that we summarize in the next section.
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DeepFake Detection Challenge
Dolhansky et al. (2020) provides the DeepFakeDetection Challenge (DFDC) data set, which
is the largest of the data sets we worked with, consisting of over 100,000 clips featuring
3,426 paid actors. The DeepFakes were generated using 8 different methods along with
varying levels of post processing. Not all of the DeepFakes are auto-encoder based face
swaps, but many are. The data set was developed with the goal of being large enough and
diverse enough so that a deepfake detection model can be trained only on the DFDC data
set and can generalize to DeepFakes one might see "in the wild".
Face Forensics++
The Face Forensics++ data set created by Rossler et al. (2019) consists of 1,000 videos
and feature four deep fake generation techniques. The videos in the data set were sourced
from YouTube, and the videos were compressed at various levels using methods common
to social network sites to create high, medium, and low quality videos. Each of the videos
from YouTube occur once as a real video and once as a fake, and they are swapped in pairs
so the subjects are not in multiple fake videos.
DeepFake Detection Data Set
The DeepFake Detection (DFDD) data set was developed by Dufour and Gully (2019) and
contains hundreds of DeepFake videos that were produced using paid actors. The videos
are organized around scenes, where an actor is filmed in one scene and several deepfakes
were made by substituting actors with a similar appearance. The creators used a total of 5
different methods to generate deepfakes with varying levels of quality.
Celeb-DF Data Set
The Celeb-DF data set created by Li et al. (2020) consists of 5,639 high quality DeepFake
videos along with 590 real videos. The real videos are interviews of 59 various celebrities
sourced from YouTube with diversity in characteristics such as face size, orientation, and
lighting. A single method is used to generate consistently high quality deepfake videos.
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Table 4.1. Table summarizing the number of frames in each of the train
test splits for our experiments.
4.3 Train Test Splits
In this section we describe the train test splits we developed for our experiments on each
data set. These splits vary based on the size of the data sets, and the way the DeepFakes were
generated. We create these train test splits to prevent overtraining on particular individuals
or scenes, since previous experiments demonstrate the analytic’s capacity to do so. We are
unable to identify which manipulation technique was featured in each video, so we were
unable to balance the train test split based on the technique used to generate the image.
Table 4.1 summarizes the number of frames that are included in the training and testing
sets.
DeepFake Detection Challenge
Due to the organization of the DFDC data set, we are able to determine the actors featured
in each video. This allows us to ensure that each actor is either included in the training set
or testing set, and are either featured in a real video or fake video but not both.
Face Forensics++
The DeepFakes in the Face Forensics++ data set were created by swapping the identities in
pairs of videos. We create a train/test split so that a single video from each pair is included
in either the training or testing set, and as either a real or fake video. For example, a real
video in the training set is not included as a deepfake video with a new identity in either the
training or testing sets.
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DeepFake Detection Data Set
The DeepFake Detection (DFDD) data set was organized around scenes, with an actor in
the real video swapped with several other actors to create several deepfakes. We created the
train/test split so that each scene is included in either the training or testing set, and as either
a real or fake video.
Celeb-DF Data Set
Each DeepFake in the Celeb-DF data set is a video that was originally a video interview.
The train test split was organized so that the actors were not repeated in either the training
or testing sets.
4.3.1 Results
We conduct a series of three experiments on each of the new data sets to test the analytic
using corrected and uncorrected head poses as well as varying the source of the training
data. The results are summarized in Table 4.2. The three columns correspond to the three
different experiments. The "Provided" column summarizes the results of using the author’s
pretrained model. The "Corrected" and "Uncorrected" columns summarize the results of
training a model on the training set formed from the new data set and either using the
corrected or uncorrected poses throughout the training and classification process. Overall,
the analytic performs poorly on these new data sets. The AUCs are nowhere close to the
promising results that Yang et al. (2019) present in their paper, and do not improve even if
the model is retrained from the new data set or if the poses are corrected.
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Provided Uncorrected Corrected
FF++ .52 .60 .63
DFDD .46 .47 .28
DFDC .54 .45 .45
Celeb-DF .50 .58 59
Table 4.2. AUC scores for various models. The “Provided” model is
pretrained on UADFV and provided by the authors. The “Uncorrected”
model is trained on the training frames from Table 4.1, without the head
pose correction. The “Corrected” model is also trained on the frames
in Table 4.1, but uses the corrected head poses.

















ROC Performance on DFDC
Corrected Model, auc: 0.45
Uncorrected Model, auc: 0.45
Provided Model, auc: 0.54

















ROC Performance on Face Forensics ++
Corrected Model, auc: 0.63
Uncorrected Model, auc: 0.60
Provided Model, auc: 0.52
Figure 4.9. ROC curves presenting the results of our experiments on
the DFDC and Face Forensics ++ data sets.
4.4 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter we show that the exceptional performance of the analytic on the
UADFV data set is due to the distribution of features caused by the flipped head poses,
along with the overtraining of the analytic on the facial features of Nicolas Cage. We present
experimental results that show that the performance of the analytic does not generalize to new
data sets. We justify our claims by presenting the distribution of features in the UADFV data
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set both before and after the head poses were corrected, and finish by presenting the results
of our experiments on train test splits designed to minimize the potential for overtraining
and provided the best possible indication of the generalizability of the results. Overall,
the analytic performed poorly in these tests indicating that several challenges remain to
successfully classify deepfakes using inconsistent head poses.
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